巴菲特在庆祝格雷罕姆与多德合著的《证券分析》发行50周年大会上的演讲:耶鲁——报酬与风险的重要关系（中英）
Before we begin this examination, I would like you to imagine a national coin-flipping contest. Let’s assume we get 225 million Americans up tomorrow morning and we ask them all to wager a dollar. They go out in the morning at sunrise, and they all call the flip of a coin. If they call correctly, they win a dollar from those who called wrong. Each day the losers drop out, and on the subsequent day the stakes build as all previous winnings are put on the line. After ten flips on ten mornings, there will be approximately 220,000 people in the United States who have correctly called ten flips in a row. They each will have won a little over $1,000.
在进行审查之前，我要各位设想一场全国性的掷铜板大赛。假定全美国2.25亿的 人口在明天早晨起床时都掷出一枚1美元的铜板。早晨太阳升起时，他们都走到门外 掷铜板，并猜铜板出现的正面或反面。如果猜对了，他们将从猜错者的手中贏得1美 元。每天输者被淘汰，奖金则不断地累积。经过10个早晨的10次投掷之后，全美国 约有2. 2万人连续10次猜对掷铜板的结果，每人所赢得的奖金约1000多美元。
Now this group will probably start getting a little puffed up about this，human nature being what it is. They may try to be modest, but at cocktail parties they will occasionally admit to attractive members of the opposite sex what their technique is，and what marvelous insights they bring to the field of flipping.
现在，这群人可能会开始炫耀自己的战绩，此乃人的天性使然。他们也许会尽 可能保持谦虚的态度，但在鸡尾酒宴会中，他们偶尔会以此技巧吸引异性的注意，并炫耀其投掷铜板的奇异洞察力o
Assuming that the winners are getting the appropriate rewards from the losers, in another ten days we will have 215 people who have successfully called their coin flips 20 times in a row and who, by this exercise, each have turned one dollar into a little over $1 million. $225 million would have been lost，$225 million would have been won.
假定赢家都可以从输家手中得到适当的奖金，再经过10天，约有215个人连续20 次猜对掷铜板的结果，这些人将赢得大约每人100万美元的奖金。输家总共付出2.25 亿美元，赢家则得到2.25亿美元。
By then, this group will really lose their heads. They will probably write books on “How I turned a Dollar into a Million in Twenty Days Working Thirty Seconds a Morning.” Worse yet, they，ll probably start jetting around the country attending seminars on efficient coin-flipping and tackling skeptical professors with, “ If it can’t be done, why are there 215 of us?”
这时候，这群人可能就会飘飘然地沉迷其中：他们可能开始著书立说：“我如 何每天早晨工作30秒，而在20天之内将1美元变成100万美元。”更糟的是，他们 会在全国各地参加宣讲会，讲授如何有效地投掷铜板，并且反驳持怀疑态度的教授 说，“如果这是不可能的事，为什么会有我们这215个人呢？ ”
By then some business school professor will probably be rude enough to bring up the fact that if 225 million orangutans had engaged in a similar exercise, the results would be much the same—215 egotistical orangutans with 20 straight winning flips.
但是，某商学院的教授可能会粗鲁地提出一项事实，如果2.25亿只猩猩参加这场 大赛，结果大致上也是如此——有215只自大的猩猩将连续赢得20次的投掷。
I would argue, however, that there are some important differences in the examples I am going to present. For one thing, if (a) you had taken 225 million orangutans distributed roughly as the U.S. population is； if (b) 215 winners were left after 20 days; and if (c) you found that 40 came from a particular zoo in Omaha, you would be pretty sure you were on to something. So you would probably go out and ask the zookeeper about what he's feeding them, whether they had special exercises, what books they read, and who knows what else. That is, if you found any really extraordinary concentrations of success, you might want to see if you could identify concentrations of unusual characteristics that might be causal factors.
然而，我必须说明，前述事例和我即将提出的案例之间存在着若干重大差异。 一方面，如果（1)你所选择的2.25亿只猩猩的分布状况与美国的人口分布大致相 同；如果（2)经过20天的竞赛，只剩下215只赢家；如果（3)你发现其中有40只猩猩来自于奥玛哈的某个动物园，则其中必有溪踐。于是，你会询问猩猩管理员各种 问题,例如它们吃什么饲料、是否做特殊的运动、阅读什么书籍……换言之，如果 你发现成功案例有非比寻常的集中现象，则你希望判定此异常的特色是否是成功的 原因。
Scientific inquiry naturally follows such a pattern. If you were trying to analyze possible causes of a rare type of cancer~with, say, 1,500 cases a year in the United States—and you found that 400 of them occurred in some little mining town in Montana, you would get very interested in the water there, or the occupation of those afflicted, or other variables. You know it’s not random chance that 400 come from a small area. You would not necessarily know the causal factors, but you would know where to search.
科学的调查也遵循此一形态。如果你试图分析某种罕见的癌症原因。例如，在 每年仅有的1500个癌症病例中，你发现蒙大拿州的某个矿区小镇就产生了400个病 例，则你必然对当地的饮水、病患的职业或其他种种变数产生兴趣，你推断在一个 小镇中发生400个病例绝不是随机因素所造成。这说明虽然你未必了解病因，但却知 道从哪里着手调查。
I submit to you that there are ways of defining an origin other than geography. In addition to geographical origins, there can be what I call an intellectual origin. I think you will find that a disproportionate number of successful coin-flippers in the investment world came from a very small intellectual village that could be called Graham-and-Doddsville. A concentration of winners that simply cannot be explained by chance can be traced to this particular intellectual village.
除了地理国家，还有其他方式可以界定起源。除了地理的起源，还有我所谓 “智力的起源”。我认为各位将在投资领域发现，有一个不成比例的现象就是很多 贏家来自一个极小的智力村庄，它可以称为“格雷厄姆一多德都市”。这个特殊智 力村存在着许多贏家。这种集中现象绝非巧合所能够解释。
Conditions could exist that would make even that concentration unimportant. Perhaps 100 people were simply imitating the coin-flipping call of some terribly persuasive personality. When he called heads, 100 followers automatically called that coin the same way. If the leader was part of the 215 left at the end, the fact that 100 came from the same intellectual origin would mean nothing. You would simply be identifying one case as a hundred cases. Similarly, let’s assume that you lived in a strongly patriarchal society and every family in the United States conveniently consisted of ten members. Further assume that the patriarchal culture was so strong that, when the 225 million people went out the first day, every member of the family identified with the father’s call. Now，at the end of the 20-day period, you would have 215 winners, and you would find that they came from only 21,5 families. Some naive types might say that this indicates an enormous hereditary factor as an explanation of successful coin-flipping. But, of course, it would have no significance at all because it would simply mean that you didn’t have 215 individual winners, but rather 21.5 randomly distributed families who were winners.
在某些情况下，即使非比寻常的集中现象也可能不重要。或许有100个只是模仿 某一位极具说服力的领导者，而依其主张来猜测铜板的投掷结果。当这位领导者猜 正面，10(Kh追随者也会自动地作相同的猜测。如果这一位领导者是属于最后215位 赢家之一，则推断这100也便属于同一个智力起源是没有任何意义的，因为这100个 案例实际上只代表一个案例。同理，假定你生活在美国一个父权结构极为严密的社 会，而每一个家庭里的10个成员都恰好以父亲马首是瞻。20天之后，你将发现215位 羸家是来自于21.5个家庭。若干天真的分析师可能因此而认为，遗传因素在成功猜测 铜板投掷结果中占有巨大作用。当然，这实际上不具有任何意义，因为你所拥有的 不是215位个别贏家，而只是21.5个随机分布的家庭。
In this group of successful investors that I want to consider, there has been a common intellectual patriarch, Ben Graham. But the children who left the house of this intellectual patriarch have called their “flips” in very different ways. They have gone to different places and bought and sold different stocks and companies, yet they have had a combined record that simply cannot be explained by the fact that they are all calling flips identically because a leader is signaling the calls for them to make. The patriarch has merely set forth the intellectual theory for making coin-calling decisions, but each student has decided on his own manner of applying the theory.
我所要考虑的这一群成功投资者，共有一位共同的智力族长——本格雷厄 姆。但是，这些离开此智力家族的孩童却用不同方法猜测自己的“铜板”。他们各 自前往不同的地方，买卖不同的股票和企业，但他们的综合绩效绝对无法用随机因素加以解释。他们作相同的猜测，只是因为领导者下达某一项指令，因此也无法用 这种方式解释他们的表现。族长只提供了猜测铜板的智力理论，每位学生都必须自 行决定如何运用这项理论。
The common intellectual theme of the investors from Graham-and-Doddsville is this： they search for discrepancies between the value of a business and the price of small pieces of that business in the market. Essentially, they exploit those discrepancies without the efficient market theorist’s concern as to whether the stocks are bought on Monday or Thursday, or whether it is January or July, etc. Incidentally, when businessmen buy businesses, which is just what our Graham & Dodd investors are doing through the purchase of marketable stocks-I doubt that many are cranking into their purchase decision the day of the week or the month in which the transaction is going to occur. If it doesn’t make any difference whether all of a business is being bought on a Monday or a Friday, I am baffled why academicians invest extensive time and effort to see whether it makes a difference when buying small pieces of those same businesses. Our Graham dc Dodd investors, needless to say， do not discuss beta, the capital asset pricing model, or covariance in returns among securities. These are not subjects of any interest to them. In fact, most of them would have difficulty defining those terms. The investors simply focus on two variables: price and value.
来自“格雷厄姆一多德都市”的投资者所具备的共同智力结构是：他们探索企 业的价值与该企业市场价格之间的差异。事实上，他们利用其间”差异，忽略了效 率市场理论家所关心的问题：股票究竟在星期一买进还是在星期四买进，是在1月份 买进抑或是在7月份买进……。当企业家买进某家公司时这正是格雷厄姆一多德 都市的投资者透过上市股票所从事的行为——我怀疑有多少人会在意交易必须发生于 某个月份或某个星期的某一天。如果企业的买进交易发生在星期一或星期五没有任何 差别，则我无法了解学术界人士为何要花费大量的时间和精力，探讨代表该企业部分 股权的交易发生时的差异。毋庸多说，格雷厄姆一多德都市的投资者并不探讨资本 资产定价模型、证券投资报酬本的变异数，因为这些都不是他们所关心的议题。事实上，他们大多数难以界定上述学术名词。他们只在乎两项实数：价格与价值。
I always find it extraordinary that so many studies are made of price and volume behavior，the stuff of chartists. Can you imagine buying an entire business simply because the price of the business had been marked up substantially last week and the week before? Of course, the reason a lot of studies are made of these price and volume variables is that now, in the age of computers，there are almost endless data available about them. It isn’t necessarily because such studies have any utility; it’s simply that the data are there and academicians have [worked] hard to learn the mathematical skills needed to manipulate them. Once these skills are acquired, it seems sinful not to use them, even if the usage has no utility or negative utility. As a friend said, to a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
我始终对分析师对价量行为所作的大量研究感到惊讶。你是否会仅仅因为某 家公司的市场价格在本周或前一周剧扬，便决定购买该企业呢？在日前电脑化的时 代，人们之所以会大量研究价格与成交量的行为，理由是这两项变数拥有了无数的 资料。研究未必是因为其具任何功用；而只是因为资料既然存在，学术界人士便必 须努力学习操作这些资料所需要的数学技巧。一旦掌握这些技巧，不去运用就会给 他们带来罪恶感，即使这些技巧的运用没有任何功用，或只会带来负面功用，他们 也在所不惜。如同一位朋友所说的，对一位持铁锤的人来说，每一样事看起来都像 是钉子。
I think the group that we have identified by a common intellectual home is worthy of study. Incidentally, despite all the academic studies of the influence of such variables as price, volume, seasonality, capitalization size, etc., upon stock performance, no interest has been evidenced in studying the methods of this unusual concentration of value-oriented winners.
我认为，这一群具有共同智力起源的投资者非常值得我们研究。虽然学术界对 价格、成交量、季节性、资本规模、对股票绩效的影响以及其他变数的研究不断地 增加，但这群以价值为导向贏家的方法却毫不受人关心。
I begin this study of results by going back to a group of four of us who worked at Graham-Newman Corporation from 1954 through 1956. There were only four— I have not selected these names from among thousands. I offered to go to work at Graham-Newman for nothing after I took Ben Graham’s class, but he turned me down as overvalued. He took this value stuff very seriously After much pestering he finally hired me. There were three partners and four of us as the “peasant” level. All four left between 1955 and 1957 when the firm was wound up，and it's possible to trace the record of three.
关于这一项绩效的研究，我首先要追溯到从1954年到1956年间工作于Greham— Newman公司的四位伙伴。我们总共四个人——我并不是从数以千计的对象中挑选这四个人。在我选修本格雷厄姆的课程之后，我要求进人Graham—Newman公司，虽 别无他求，但格雷厄姆却以价值高估而拒绝了我的要求。他对价值看得非常严重！ 经我不断地恳求，他最后答应雇我。当时公司有三位合伙股东，以及我们四位“学 徒”。公司结束经营之后，我们四个人陆续在1955年到1957年间离开公司，目前只 能够追踪其中三个人的记录。
The first example is that of Walter Schloss. Walter never went to college, but took a course from Ben Graham at night at the New York Institute of Finance. Walter left Graham-Newman in 1955 and achieved the record shown here over 28 years. Here is what “Adam Smith”一after I told him about Walter~wrote about him in Supermoney (1972).
第一个案例是华特史洛斯。华特从来没有念过大学，但他在纽约金融协会参 加了本杰明葛雷厄姆的夜间课程。华特在1955年离开Greham—Newman公司。以 下是“亚当史密斯”——在我和他谈论有关华特的事迹之后——在《超级金钱》(Supermoney, 1972年）一书中对他所作的描述：
He has no connections or access to useful information. Practically no one in Wall Street knows him and he is not fed any ideas. He looks up the numbers in the manuals and sends for the annual reports, and that’s about it.
他从来不接触或运用有用的资讯。在华尔街几乎没有人认识他，所以没有人提 供他有关投资的观念。他只参考手册上的数字,并要求企业寄年报给他，情况便是 如此。
In introducing me to (Schloss) Warren had also, to my mind, described himself. “He never forgets that he is handling other people’s money, and this reinforces his normal strong aversion to loss.” He has total integrity and a realistic picture of himself. Money is real to him and stocks are real—and from this flows an attraction to the “margin of safety” principle.
当华特介绍我们认识时，我记得他曾这样描述过：“他从来没有忘记自己是在 管理别人的资金，这进一步强化了他对于风险的厌恶。”他有高尚的品格，并以务 实的态度自持。对他来说，金钱是真实的，股票也真实的——并从此而接受了 “安全边际”的原则。
I'm convinced that there is much inefficiency in the market. These Graham-and-Doddsville investors have successfully exploited gaps between price and value. When the price of a stock can be influenced by a “herd” on Wall Street with prices set at the margin by the most emotional person, or the greediest person, or the most depressed person, it is hard to argue that the market always prices rationally. In fact, market prices are frequently nonsensical.
我相信市场上存在着许多没有效率的现象。这些来自于“格雷厄姆一多德都 市”的投资人成功地掌握了价格与价值之间的缺口。华尔街的“群众”可以影响股 票价格，当最情绪化的人、最贪婪的或最沮丧的人肆意驱动股价时，我们很难辩称 市场价格是理性的产物。事实上，市场经常是不合理的。
I would like to say one important thing about risk and reward. Sometimes risk and reward are correlated in a positive fashion. If someone were to say to me, “I have here a six-shooter and I have slipped one cartridge into it. Why don’t you just spin it and pull it once? If you survive, I will give you $1 million.” I would decline—perhaps stating that $1 million is not enough. Then he might offer me $5 million to pull the trigger twice—now that would be a positive correlation between risk and reward.
我想提出有关报酬与风险之间的重要关系。有时报酬与风险之间成正比。如果 有人告诉我“我有一支六发弹装的左轮枪，并且填装一发子弹。你可以任意地拨动 转轮，然后朝自己扣一次扳机。如果你能够逃过一功，我就赏你100万美元。”我将 会拒绝这项提议——或许我的理由是100万美元太少了。然后，他可能建议将奖金提 高为500万美元，但必须扣两次扳机——这便是报酬与风险之间成正比！
The exact opposite is true with value investing. If you buy a dollar bill for 60 cents, it's riskier than if you buy a dollar bill for 40 cents, but the expectation of reward is greater in the latter case. The greater the potential for reward in the value portfolio, the less risk there is.
在价值投资法当中，情况恰巧相反。如果你以60美分买进1美元的纸钞，其风险 大于以40美分买进1美元的纸钞，但后者报酬的期望值却比较高。以价值为导向的投 资组合，报酬潜力愈高风险愈低。
One quick example. The Washington Post Company in 1973 was selling for $80 million in the market. At the time, that day, you could have sold the assets to any one of ten buyers for not less than $400 million，probably appreciably more. The company owned the Post，Newsweek，plus several television stations in major markets. Those same properties are worth $2 billion now, so the person who would have paid $400 million would not have been crazy.
我可以举一个简单的例子：在1973年，华盛顿邮报公司的总市值为8000万美元。在这一天，你可以将其资产以4亿美元甚至更高的价格卖给10个买家中的任意一 个。该公司拥有华盛顿邮报、商业周刊以及数家重要的电视台。这些资产目前的价 值为4乙美元，因此愿意支付4亿美元的买家并非疯子。
Now, if the stock had declined even further to a price that made the valuation $40 million instead of $80 million, its beta would have been greater. And to people that think beta measures risk, the cheaper price would have made it look riskier. This is truly Alice in Wonderland. I have never been able to figure out why it's riskier to buy $400 million worth of properties for $40 million than $80 million. And, as a matter of fact, if you buy a group of such securities and you know anything at all about business valuation, there is essentially no risk in buying $400 million for $80 million, particularly if you do it by buying ten $40 million piles of $8 million each. Since you don’t have your hands on the $400 million, you want to be sure you are in with honest and reasonably competent people, but that’s not a difficult job.
现在，如果股价继续下跌，该企业的市值从8000万美元跌到4000万美元，其变 数值也上升。对于用变数值衡量风险的人来说，更低的价格使它更具有风险。这真 是仙境中的爱丽丝。我永远无法了解，用4000万美元，而非8000万美元购买价值4亿 美元的资产，其风险竟然更高。事实上，如果你买进一堆这样的证券，而且稍微了 解所谓的企业评价，用8000万购买4亿元的资产基本没有风险，尤其是分别以800万 美元的价格买进10种价值4000万美元的资产，其风险更低。因为你不拥有4亿美元， 所以你希望能够确实找到诚实而有能力的人，这并不困难。
You also have to have the knowledge to enable you to make a very general estimate about the value of the underlying businesses. But you do not cut it close. That is what Ben Graham meant by having a margin of safety. You don’t try and buy businesses worth $83 million for $80 million. You leave yourself an enormous margin. When you build a bridge, you insist it can carry 30,000 pounds, but you only drive 10,000 pound trucks across it. And that same principle works in investing.
另外，你必须有知识，而且能够粗略地估计企业的价值。但是，你不需要精 密的评价知识。这便是本杰明葛拉厄姆所谓的安全边际。你不必试图以8000万美 元的价格购买价值8300万美元的企业，因为适当的缓冲是必要的。这就如同架设桥 梁，你坚持载重量为3万磅，但你只准许1万磅的卡车穿梭其间。相同的原则也适用于投资领域。
In conclusion, some of the more commercially minded among you may wonder why I am writing this article. Adding many converts to the value approach will perforce narrow the spreads between price and value. I can only tell you that the secret has been out for 50 years, ever since Ben Graham and Dave Dodd wrote Security Analysis，yet I have seen no trend toward value investing in the 35 years that Fve practiced it. There seems to be some perverse human characteristic that likes to make easy things difficult. The academic world, if anything, has actually backed away from the teaching of value investing over the last 30 years. It's likely to continue that way. Ships will sail around the world but the Flat Earth Society will flourish. There will continue to be wide discrepancies between price and value in the marketplace, and those who read their Graham & Dodd will continue to prosper.
总而言之，有些具备商业头脑的人可能会怀疑我撰写本文的动机：更多人皈依 价值投资法，将会缩小价值与价格之间的差距。我只能够如此告诉各位，自从本杰 明格雷厄姆与大卫多德出版《证券分析》，这个秘密已经流传了50年，在我奉 行这项投资理论的35年中，我不曾目睹价值投资法蔚然成风。偏执似乎是人的天性 的特点之一，因为人们喜欢把简单的事情弄得更复杂。最近30年来，学术界如果有 任何作为的话，乃完全背离了价值投资的教训，而它很可能继续如此。船只将环绕 地球而行，但地平之说仍会畅行无阻。在市场上，价格与价值之间还会存在着宽广 的差值，而奉行格雷厄姆与多德理论的人也会繁荣不绝。
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